COMMENTS
The Collateral Use of Foreign Convictions in
American Criminal Trials
The number of Americans convicted in foreign countries of
criminal offenses has increased in recent years with the growth of
the American presence overseas. As a result, American courts have
been confronted with a substantial number of cases in which the
prosecution has sought to introduce prior foreign convictions for
collateral purposes. In particular, prosecutors have attempted to
introduce these convictions to impeach witnesses,' prove intent,
knowledge, motive, and the like in the commission of a crime, 2 or
to increase punishment under habitual-offender statutes.3 Within
the restrictive bounds set by the rules of evidence,4 the courts have
been especially sympathetic to the use of these convictions, often
E.g., United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1977). Formerly, convicted felons
were completely barred from testifying; they were treated as incompetents. See McCoRMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 64 (2d ed. E. Cleary gen. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK]. During the nineteenth century, state courts were divided over whether a
conviction from a sister state rendered a witness incompetent. See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (8th ed. 1883); J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 522, at 615 n.3 (3d ed. 1940).
Compare Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 540-41 (1822) (witness competent) with
State v. Candler, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 393, 399 (1824) (witness incompetent).
2 E.g., United States v. Ogle, 587 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (used to
establish identity); United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 270-71 (10th Cir.) (used to establish
intent and knowledge), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
3 E.g., United States ex rel. Read v. Martin, 263 F.2d 606, 606 (2d Cir. 1959) (per
curiam); United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
United States ex rel. Dennis v. Murphy, 184 F. Supp. 384, 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1959); People v.
d'A Philippo, 220 Cal. 620, 624-25, 32 P.2d 962, 964 (1934) (en banc); State v. O'Day, 191
La. 380, 387-88, 185 So. 290, 292 (1938); People ex rel. Latraverse v. Jackson, 284 A.D. 822,
822, 132 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (1954) (mem.); People ex rel. Stevens v. Jackson, 283 A.D. 3, 5,
125 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907 (1953).
1 Most American courts narrowly restrict the collateral use of prior convictions, primarily
because they tend to create prejudice against an accused. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §
43. It is common for a jurisdiction to limit the purposes for which a prior conviction may be
introduced, see, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(b), and some jurisdictions limit the kind of convictions
that may be used for any of the permissible purposes, see MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 43, at
89. Courts apply various procedures designed to limit any untoward effects at trial. For
example, courts ordinarily have wide discretion to exclude a conviction if the danger of
prejudice outweighs its probative value. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a). In addition, in most
cases the facts underlying a conviction will not be admissible since their proof would likely
divert the trier from the central issues before it. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 43, at 88.
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admitting them without a rigorous examination of the context in
which they arose.
The uninformed collateral use of foreign convictions may present serious constitutional questions. In Burgett v. Texas, 5 the Supreme Court held that a state violated due process by using a previous conviction, secured in violation of due process, to enhance
punishment under a recidivist statute. Although the Court has since
extended this principle to cases in which a constitutionally infirm
prior conviction had been used to impeach witnesses 6 and to impose
sentence,7 its precise rationale remains obscure. Some lower courts
view Burgett as barring the use of improperly obtained prior convictions on the ground that to do so would cause the defendant to
"suffer anew" the previous deprivation of constitutional rights.8
Another interpretation focuses on the unreliability of the ptior convictions obtained without certain constitutional protections.'
These concerns surrounding the collateral use of domestic convictions become even more problematic in cases involving foreign
convictions. Foreign procedures seldom conform to constitutional
standards, and if Burgett is read to require that prior convictions
be constitutionally proper, the use of all foreign convictions in
American courts may be precluded. Even if Burgett only protects a
defendant from the use of unreliable convictions against him, serious practical obstacles are raised against the successful use of foreign convictions.
This comment argues that, subject to some exceptions, reliability is the proper standard for determining the permissible collateral
use of foreign convictions and that wholly unfamiliar procedures
used in foreign forums may meet that standard. The practical obstacles to implementing such a standard, however, require a careful
limitation of the procedures adopted in overseeing such collateral
use. Accordingly, the comment proposes a procedural schema for
screening foreign convictions for possible collateral use in American
proceedings.
5 389 U.S.

109 (1967).
4 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (defendant testifying on his own behalf).
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
The "suffer anew" language was used by the Supreme Court in Burgett, 389 U.S. at
115. For an example of a lower court applying similar reasoning, see Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d
313 (5th Cir. 1969).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92, 96 (1st Cir.) (Aldrich, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973).
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DUE PROCESS THEORY AND COLLATERAL USE

A. The Constitutional Background-Burgett v. Texas
In Burgett v. Texas,,0the defendant had been charged with one
count of assault with intent to murder and four counts under the
Texas recidivist statute." The latter counts consisted "of allegations
that [the defendant] had incurred four previous felony convictions"; 2 a sentence of life imprisonment was mandated if the defendant was convicted of the offense in the first count13 and the allegations in the latter counts proved to be true. With respect to the
latter counts, the prosecution had introduced evidence of the defendant's prior convictions, one of which had been secured without
counsel.' 4 Since such a conviction was void under Gideon v.
Waintbright,1 5 the Court reasoned that its use against the defendant
"either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense
8 Moreover, the Court
. . .is to erode the principle of [Gideon].""

held, "since the defect in the prior convicton was denial of the right
to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation
of the Sixth Amendment right."" Admission of the prior conviction
therefore constituted constitutional error.
The Burgett Court's reliance on the "erosion" and "suffering
anew" language suggests an expansive view of the nature of the due
process violation: all of the procedures of the first proceeding are
imputed to the second. If the collateral use of a foreign conviction
were considered under such a "holistic" analysis,18 what was origi10389 U.S. 109 (1967).
" Typically, recidivist statutes allow an additional basis for punishing a defendant who
has been previously convicted of a felony. For an example of such a statute, see id. at 111
n.3. Introduction of prior convictions for purpose of recidivist statutes may result in jury
prejudice with respect to the primary, unenhanced charges against the accused. Yet the
Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), held that, with the use of limiting
instructions, jurors may be informed of the prior convictions before passing on the accused's
guilt or innocence of the primary charge(s).
1 389 U.S. at 111.
13Id.
,1The record of the defective conviction indicated on its face that the defendant had
been without counsel in the prior proceeding. Id. at 112. The Court did not indicate how the
existence of a defect in a prior conviction may be proved when such existence is subject to
dispute. While this issue has troubled the Court since Burgett, see Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473, 485 (1972) (White, J., concurring in result), it remains unresolved.
15372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114.
, 389 U.S. at 115.
" Id. The Court later formulated the problem as the defendant's right to counsel having
been "denied anew." Id. at 116.
1' A recent commentator has used the terms "holistic" and "segmented" to describe two
approaches to scrutinizing American involvement in foreign procedure when a foreign sen-
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nally foreign process, not subject to American constitutional constraints,' would become subject to scrutiny under the American
Constitution. The principle of Burgett would thus also be applied
to cases in which the defect in the first proceeding was not absence
20
of counsel.
Some courts have implicitly adopted this reading of Burgett.2
tence is executed in the United States under a prisoner exchange treaty. Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American
PrisonerTransfer Treaty, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1500, 1503-06 (1977).
11Unless a foreign court can be shown to have acted as an American agent, it is a creature
of a foreign sovereign and is not subject to constitutional constraints. See, e.g., In re Ross,
140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974);
Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1971); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
To be sure, the Constitution does accompany the American government abroad. See Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). An incidental presence, however, is usually insufficient to
result in application of the Constitution if the acts in question are primarily those of a foreign
sovereign. See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969).
The territorial limitation on the reach of the Constituton is paralleled in other areas as
well. For example, while there are some areas of the law in which United States courts may
legitimately exercise jurisdiction over matters occurring abroad, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18, Comment f, Illustration 9 (1965)
(antitrust violation abroad having effect within United States); id. § 33, Reporter's Note
(proscription of perjury abroad before diplomatic or consular officer of the United States),
jurisdiction over less unusual crimes-for example, rape, murder, or larceny-is strictly territorial, id. § 18. Even the bases of jurisdiction reveal a consciousness of the limits of sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction to territory, citizens, special security concerns, id. § 10, and
certain areas of general interests such as piracy, id. § 34.
Another parallel to territorial limits on the Constitution's reach is present in the rule of
statutory construction that American statutes, both state and federal, "apply only to conduct
occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." Id. § 38.
" The circuits have split regarding the question whether a prior domestic conviction
suffering from some other constitutional defect is within the scope of the Burgett rule.
Compare United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92-94 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973)
with Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1969).
It should also be noted that the principle in Burgett has not been extended to cases in
which a prior conviction is used to impeach a prosecution witness. In considering when due
process permits the admission of a prosecution witness's prior conviction, courts have balanced the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation (including his right to impeach
by introducing evidence casting doubt on the credibility of a witness) against the state's
interests in the witness's privacy. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Since the right
to confront prosecution witnesses is constitutionally guaranteed and since defendants are
exposed to the serious risk of penal sanctions, the Court has struck this balance strongly in
favor of disclosure of prosecution witnesses' convictions. See id. While it might be possible
in extreme cases to exclude a prosecution witness's foreign conviction if it had been secured
in such an unreliable fashion as to make it unlikely that the witness actually committed thb
crime, foreign convictions should almost always be admitted when used to impeach prosecution witnesses.
21 See, e.g., Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1969). In United States ex rel.
LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962), a habeas corpus decision antedating Burgett,
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Yet the holistic approach seems unacceptably formalistic and fails
to define precisely the nature of the due process question involved.
The approach permits two alternative and contradictory views of a
due process violation that results from the collateral use of a foreign
conviction. The familiar characterization is that by using the conviction, the domestic court has adopted the foreign procedures as its
own. Both the domestic and foreign procedures are then subject to
due process scrutiny. Alternatively, some courts have treated the
defective prior conviction as "invalid, '2 thereby vitiating the second conviction. But, since the American Constitution does not
apply to the legal processes of foreign countries,2 a foreign conviction is not void in relation to American law and the second proceeding remains untainted. Ultimately, both theories are excessively
formalistic, turning on legal fictions.
Apart from the ambiguity of the holistic analysis, a construction of Burgett subjecting the original foreign procedures to rigid
due process scrutiny because domestic courts have in some sense
used them is inconsistent with prevailing doctrine in other cases
involving domestic reliance upon foreign conduct. In decisions remithe Second Circuit considered the collateral use of an uncounselled Missouri conviction in
New York. Responding to New York's contention that its use of the Missouri conviction did
not render it responsible for the Missouri procedure, Judge Friendly held that the violation
of due process was by New York, not Missouri. Id. at 420. He relied for this result on two
earlier habeas corpus cases, United States ex rel. Dennis v. Murphy, 265 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1959); United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), involving the
use of Canadian convictions obtained against juveniles who did not have counsel at their
trials, and the statement in United States ex reL Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.
1957), a case similar to LaNear, that" 'to the extent that any State makes its penal sanctions
depend in part on the fact of prior convictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume the
burden of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such prior convictions.'" LaNear, 306
F.2d at 421 (quoting Savini, 250 F.2d at 355).
One should not conclude from LaNear that a holistic approach for scrutinizing due
process objections to the collateral use of prior convictions traces its genealogy to a preBurgett era. LaNear dealt with the requirement that there be an exhaustion of state court
remedies before a federal court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). The defendant had exhausted his remedies with respect to the New
York conviction, but had failed to do so with respect to the prior conviction in Missouri.
Relying on the holistic principle, Judge Friendly concluded that the defendant was not barred
from seeking a writ of habeas corpus despite his failure to exhaust state court remedies with
respect to the Missouri conviction. The application of the holistic approach by Judge Friendly
to the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, however, does not necessarily mean that such
an approach is appropriate for resolving due process concerns attending the collateral use of
foreign convictons. Furthermore, both LaNear and the two decisions cited involved cases in
which, as in Burgett, the defect in the prior conviction was the absence of counsel. Thus, these
cases are in substance, if not in their language, consistent with the "segmented" approach
to prior convictions discussed below, see text and notes at notes 29-32 infra.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) (dictum).
21 See note 19 supra.
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niscent of the old "silver platter doctrine, 2' 4 American courts have,

for example, rejected application of the exclusionary rule to evidence garnered by foreign officials in violation of the fourth and fifth
amendments. 5 Exclusion of such evidence is properly viewed as
unlikely to deter foreign misconduct, 2 and this perception of the
interests involved has prevailed over any abstract formulations
about participation in the foreign process.2 Foreign and domestic
activities remain separate and distinct despite the reliance of the
later proceeding on the first.2
These difficulties with a holistic approach to the due process
question suggest that too literal a reading of the "suffers anew"
language in Burgett may obscure the interests truly implicated in
that case. A better construction of Burgett may instead rest on the
unreliability of the prior conviction. 2 In asserting that collateral use
24 During part of the era in which the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states,
the doctrine made it "permissible for federal courts to receive into evidence items which were
obtained in a state search by means which, if engaged in by federal officers, would constitute
a violation of the Fourth Amendment." 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.3(c), at 50
(1978). The doctrine was abolished by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 248 N.E.2d 246 (1969). The level
of involvement typically necessary to be characterized as government involvement calling for
application of the Constitution is quite high. See note 19 supra.
21 See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 248 N.E.2d 246 (1969). Deterrence fails
only if American agents are not involved.
" See, e.g., United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711-12 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 906 (1976); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 95, 248 N.E.2d 246, 247-48
(1969). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 24, § 1.6(g). See also id. § 1.7(a); Comment,
JurisdictionFollowing Illegal ExtraterritorialSeizure: InternationalHuman Rights Obligations as an Alternative to ConstitutionalStalemate, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1439 (1976).
" The principle that foreign and domestic proceedings are separate and distinct also
seems to underlie Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). In Neely, the Supreme Court rejected
a challenge to an extradition act that the act failed to ensure that the accused's constitutional
rights would be secure in the foreign tribunal.
While examination of a sister state's tribunal is impermissible, see Michigan v. Doran,
439 U.S. 282 (1978), the Second Circuit has recently expressed a willingness to examine
foreign process in particularly compelling cases, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Bloomfield v.
Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
2 There is some evidence that the phrase "suffers anew" was directed at the problem of
jury prejudice. As has been noted, see note 11 supra, Burgett arose only after the Court had
decided Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), in which it approved the Texas procedure that
allowed the introduction into evidence of properly obtained prior convictions (for the purpose
of Texas's recidivist statutes) before jury determination of guilt or innocence on the primary
charge or charges. It is thus possible that the risk of prejudice from a defective conviction,
especially when coupled with the importance of the Gideon principles, is what motivated the
Court's choice of language in Burgett. The Court was perhaps primarily concerned not with
the effect of the prior conviction under the recidivist statute but with its prejudicial impact
on the jury in deliberating on the primary charges in the second trial. That the Court raised
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of an improperly obtained conviction causes the accused to "suffer
anew" from the constitutional defect, the Court linked its conclusion directly to the type of violation at issue, the denial of the right
to counsel.3 0 Since the principle of Gideon v. Wainwright rests on
the proposition that counsel is essential to a trustworthy verdict,3 '
the Court may have been indicating its concern, not with the use of
a defective prior conviction per se, but with the use of a prior conviction grounded in procedures that call into question the reliability of
the verdict. Collateral use of such a conviction introduces into the
second trial the danger that a second false conviction may be the
result of the original due process violation; thus, the defendant may
"suffer anew" from the denial of his constitutional rights in the prior
proceeding.2
This reading of Burgett focuses on the character of the defective
conviction and its role in the second proceeding rather than on the
mere existence of the defect in the first. It is a "segmented" approach to the problem in that it treats the two proceedings as distinct, acknowledging only that the earlier proceeding has an impact
on the subsequent one. Directed toward correct results rather than
procedural purity, this approach necessarily looks to the policies
and interests underlying the constitutional protection to determine
whether the absence of that protection may distort the outcome of
the second case. Ultimately, it distinguishes between two classes of
defects: those that threaten the reliability of the judicial proceeding
and those that reflect American conceptions about the proper relationship between citizen and state. As the next section will demonstrate, this latter category of due process violations-collectively
referred to as "the political element of fairness"-is largely irrelevant to cases involving prosecution of an American citizen in a
foreign country.
B.

The Political Element of Fairness
In modern American jurisprudence, the guarantee of due pro-

the prejudice issues explicitly in the sentence immediately following the language on suffering
anew supports this interpretation. 389 U.S. at 115.
Where the collateral use of a prior conviction is not affected by the unreliability of the
conviction, however, Burgett would not be controlling. See Lewis v. United States, 48
U.S.L.W. 4205, 4208 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1980) (No. 78-1595) (permitting the use of an allegedly
uncounseled prior conviction as the predicate for subsequent conviction under a firearms
statute). But see id. at 4210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115.
11See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
12 For example, based on a false conviction, an accused may be convicted of being a
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33
cess has been dominated by the concept of fundamental fairness,
34
a concept that does not lend itself to simple theoretical analysis.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the due process clause has been
applied to criminal procedure in recent years suggests that a clear
distinction between the reliability and political elements of fundamental fairness underlies Supreme Court decisions.3 5 On one hand,
the Court has examined the constitutionality of defects in criminal
procedure that impair the accuracy of the factfinding process and
increase the risk that an innocent person may be convicted.3 6 Such
defects go to the heart of the legal process and ordinarily call for
careful scrutiny of their impact. On the other hand, some defects
in criminal procedure are significant primarily from the standpoint
of the relationship of the government to its citizens. Restrictions on
search and seizure and the privilege against self-incrimination, for
example, do not relate directly to the reliability of the factfinding
process.3 7 Rather, they represent conscious decisions about the pro3
per relationship between the state and the individual.

habitual offender under a recidivist statute. Another possibility is that an innocent defendant
may be convicted through the use of a false prior conviction to impeach his alibi or other

exculpatory testimony. Similar problems are raised in other contexts in which a false conviction is relied on.
3 The Court has described this concept in a number of ways. See L. TIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 506-07 (1978).
3, See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due ProcessAdjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
'5 This distinction has been most evident in decisions involving retroactive application
of Court decisions that incorporated Bill of Rights safeguards into the fourteenth amendment.
As a general rule, the Court has granted retroactive application only to those decisions that
concerned rights affecting reliability, such as the right of an indigent to a trial record for use
on appeal, Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per
curiam) (extending Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The Court has refused such application in cases involving the political elemeint of fairness. E.g., United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531 (1975) (refusing to extend Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973));
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (refusing to extend Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) (refusing to extend Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
The distinction was also somewhat evident in decisions predating the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence that involved the use for impeachment purposes of convictions
subsequently reversed on appeals. Some of the decisions suggested that convictions overturned for reasons unrelated to reliability may be admitted. See, e.g., Smith v. Spina, 477
F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 870 (1973); State v. Murray, 86 Wash. 2d 165, 167, 543 P.2d 332, 334-35 (1975) (en
banc). But see Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
" See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 638-39 (1965).
31Prohibitions against coerced confessions must be excepted, of course, for they are likely
to be unreliable.
" See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Underwood, The Thumb on
the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1307-08

(1977) (reasons for beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof).
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In considering the permissible uses of foreign convictions,
American courts have placed greater emphasis on the reliability
component than on the political element of fairness. Since prior
convictions can play a significant role in the guilt determination or
sentencing of an accused and since the evidentiary rules ordinarily
prevent effective examination of the facts underlying them, an unreliable prior conviction has a potentially powerful distorting effect on
the later proceeding.3 9 In the case of a recidivist statute, the impact
may even be conclusive. 0
The failure of foreign procedures to satisfy the political element
of fairness is, however, less significant. The reach of the Constitution is limited to nationhl boundaries and simply does not govern
political relationships abroad.' It is futile to require that foreign
convictions the prosecution 'seeks to use for collateral purposes satisfy the political element of fairness. An illustrative example is that
of a foreign conviction based on evidence that would have been
excluded on fourth amendment grounds at an American trial. The
foreign country has completely vindicated its own interest by convicting and punishing the defendant as its law demands. The subsequent use to which the conviction is put by an American court
should be of little interest to the foreign country, since it does not
"' See note 32 supra. This concern underlies the decision in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473
(1972), a case involving the collateral use of a domestic conviction. In Loper, the defendant
charged with rape had taken the stand as the sole witness in his own defense. During crossexamination, the defendant "admitted in damaging detail," id. at 474, to four prior felony
convictions, all of which had allegedly been obtained at proceedings in which the defendant
had been denied his right to counsel. The defendant was convicted. Given the distorting effect
the earlier Gideon violations might have had on the reliability of the rape conviction, the
Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the court of appeals denying the defendant a writ
of habeas corpus and remanded for further proceedings.
11 Its conclusiveness depends on the theory or theories underlying recidivist statutes. One
commentator has identified four possible justifications for these statutes. R. SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT

67-74 (1979). The first is that the repeat

offender is more blameworthy since he had notice through his prior conviction of the seriousness of the criminal law. Id. at 68. The second is a variant of the first, and relies upon an
analogy to the treatment of juveniles: a first offender, like a juvenile, is less blameworthy
since he does not appreciate the full import of his behavior. Id. at 71? Under either variation,
the use of an unreliable prior conviction to enhance punishment under a recidivist statute
remains proper. If the concern of recidivist statutes is merely the naivet6 of the accused, then
a prior conviction, whether or not reliable, is evidence of the accused's familiarity with and
appreciation of the seriousness of criminal conduct.
The other two justifications Singer offers, however, suggest that reliability of the prior
conviction is important. According to Singer, the third justification for recidivist statutes is
that the accused, by committing repeat offenses, evinces an antisocial character trait. Id. at
70. Finally, Singer resorts to a gut-level justification: "we simply feel that" a second offender
is more morally culpable. Id. at 72. Reliability affects the third justification since a person
who was falsely convicted cannot be said to evince an antisocial character. A false conviction
would also mean that the gut-level reaction of greater moral culpability is unfounded.
1' See note 19 supra.
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alter the balance of governmental and individual interests there.
The subsequent use of the foreign conviction also does not implicate
citizen-state relations in the United States. Moreover, the primary
policy underlying the exclusionary rule-deterrence of constitutional violations-would not be furthered through application of the
rule to foreign convictions. The law-enforcement officials of the foreign country are unlikely to be deterred, even assuming such deterrence were proper, by an American court's exclusion of the foreign
conviction since the foreign court retains full authority to try and
punish violations of its laws. And the American authorities, who
bear the effects of the exclusionary rule, are powerless to change
foreign practices.2 The rule's application is therefore likely to be
wholly symbolic.1

When collateral use of foreign convictions is inconsistent with
the political element of fairness, the holistic analysis provides an
inadequate foundation on which to base the due process scrutiny of
the collateral use. By adopting a foreign conviction as a formal part
of its own procedure, the American court would be forced to exclude
potentially reliable evidence without affecting the balance of
citizen-state relations prescribed by the Constitution. On the other
hand, the domestic court's use of the segmented approach, by
separating the foreign and domestic proceedings, creates an opportunity for an intelligent evaluation of the legal process producing
the prior conviction and the actual impact of that conviction on the
later proceedings.
Further support for the use of a segmented approach in scrutinizing the collateral use of foreign convictions is found in the treatment by American civilian courts of prior convictions obtained in
the military and Indian courts. Reliability of verdicts remains a goal
42 American courts routinely reject challenges to the introduction of evidence that was
acquired through foreign police misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th

Cir. 1973); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States
v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d
775, 782-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965); People v. Helfend, 1 Cal. App. 3d
873, 82 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967 (1970); Commonwealth v. Wallace,
356 Mass. 92, 248 N.E.2d 246 (1969).

The application of the exclusionary rule by American courts to foreign police misconduct
would be merely symbolic in the sense that the deterrence aim of the exclusionary rule would
not be served. Such an application of the exclusionary rule, however, might still have legal
significance. See Note, Searches South of the Border: Admission of Evidence Seized by
Foreign Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 886, 898 (1968) (arguing that a blanket exclusionary
rule "will place all nations on notice of the high regard of our courts for individuals' rights,
and will relieve the courts of the problem of applying different standards according to the
place where the search occurred"); text and notes at notes 50-54 infra.
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of each of these alternative criminal justice systems, yet neither
employs all of the procedures that are demanded by the political
element of fairness. 3 Military due process, for example, does not
provide such fundamental civilian protections as trial by jury" and
grand jury indictment. 5 Only in recent years have the Indian tribal
courts been required by .statute to provide most of the customary
American procedural protections.4 6 The delay in imposing the additional procedures is attributable to the peculiar constitutional status of the Indian nations as sovereignties but not states, 47 and to the
13 Military due process is not coextensive with civilian due process since the former
derives from the specific task of maintaining discipline and order in the Armed Services. See
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953); id. at 149 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.). But see Comment, Investigative
Proceduresin the Military:A SearchforAbsolutes, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 878 (1965). The military
procedures, while different, do contain protections for defendants that some maintain are
greater than those afforded by civilian tribunals. See Moyer, ProceduralRights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a Civilian Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970). Yet, the
holistic approach would measure military procedures against a civilian standard that they
would almost 6ertainly be unable to satisfy.
" See Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950).
'5 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. In some military proceedings, such as the summary courtmartial, defense counsel may be denied. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976);
Comment, The Summary Court-Martialin ConstitutionalPerspective, 14 Hous. L. REV. 449
(1977). The summary court-martial is a frequently employed proceeding. See 2 U.S. DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE

47 (1972) (of total courts-martial in fiscal year 1972, over 23,000, or 43.8%, were
summary).
Even more striking than summary courts-martial are the nonjudicial disciplinary proceedings sanctioned under article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
815 (1976). In article 15 actions, the commanding officer who brings the charge is also the
sole adjudicator. Article 15 actions are numerous and sometimes involve serious crimes. 3
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra, at 91-113. Moreover, the adjudicative officer has the power to
confine an enlisted man to "correctional custody" for up to 30 days. Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25, 36 (1976).
11Known as the "Indian Bill of Rights," now 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976), the law was
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77, Titles II to VII
deal generally with Indian civil rights, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976), while Title II, section
202, is the equivalent of the Bill of Rights, id. § 1302.
Not all rights are guaranteed. The most notable exception is indigents' right to counsel,
for as 25 U.S.C. section 1302(6) states: "No Indian tribe . . . shall deny to any person in a
criminal proceeding [in tribal court] the right. . . at his own expense to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1976) (emphasis added). Free counsel for
indigents, required in federal and state courts since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), is not required in tribal courts. See
Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1976).
'1 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); Colliflower v. Garland, 342
F.2d 369, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1965). But see Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal
Governments, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 581, 599 (1966) ("A method of resolution which the courts
are barely beginning to explore is the concept of treating the tribe as a state or territory for
purposes of applying the due process clause."). The fourteenth amendment does not apply
to the Indian nations because they are not states.
ARMED FORcES
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Indian's cultural background."
American courts nevertheless have frequently allowed the collateral use of convictions from the military and Indian tribunals."
The ready use of these convictions by the courts demonstrates that
criminal procedures failing to satisfy the requirements of the political element of fairness can still be tolerable as long as they provide
trustworthy results. These different domestic judicial systems thus
raise the prospect that convictions from foreign legal systems might
be used in domestic courts without offending notions of fundamental fairness. This conclusion, however, can be pushed too far. Not
only is the line between the political element of fairness and reliability often difficult to draw, but an American court should be uneasy
about admitting a conviction obtained through procedures involving gross violations of basic American political standards. This
unease suggests that a threshold exists beyond which violations of
the political element of fairness are intolerable. Such unease apparently stems from a third aspect of due process analysis-the
element of judicial integrity.
C.

Shock of the Conscience

Prior to the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states in
Mapp v. Ohio,50 the Supreme Court encountered a number of cases
in which defendants complained of egregious state misconduct. In
response, it fashioned a subdoctrine within the political element of
11Statutory language applicable to tribal courts, see note 46 supra, contains the terms
"due process" and "equal protection." They are not, however, the familiar concepts of AngloAmerican law, but are subject to interpretation in light of Indian tradition. Tom v. Sutton,
533 F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 681-82 (10th Cir.
1971); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-55 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on othergrounds,
521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
" Such convictions have been used for a variety of purposes, including impeachment,
e.g., United States v. Whiting, 308 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1962) (impeachment with courtmartial conviction), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909, 919 (1963); United States v. Colletti, 245 F.2d
781, 782 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957); Perkins v. Baker, 41 Okla. 288,
293, 137 P. 661, 663-64 (1913) (per curiam) (impeachment with conviction from Seminole
Nation tribal court). They have also been used in the recidivist context. E.g., People ex rel.
Stewart v. Wilson, 257 A.D. 555, 555, 13 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (1939) (court-martial sodomy
conviction within statute allowing use of felony convictions secured "under the laws of any
other state, government or country," since court-martial is federal tribunal). But see State
v. Paxton, 201 Kan. 353, 364-65, 440 P.2d 650, 659-60 (court-martial convictions for robbery
and felonious assault not within scope of legislative intent in providing for use of convictions
obtained "in or out of this state"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). One state specifically
provides for the use of court-martial convictions in its habitual-offender statute. OR. REv.
STAT. § 161.725 (1977).
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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fairness known as judicial integrity.5 ' The theory underlying this
concept is that by allowing the use of evidence seized in a manner
that "offend[s] the community's sense of fair play and decency,"
a court "afford[s] brutality the cloak of law, 5' 2 and thereby diminishes the integrity of the legal system. Although this branch of the
political element of fairness developed primarily as a means of ensuring minimum compliance by the states with established norms,
a purpose that was rendered obsolete by the incorporation of most
of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, the idea of
judicial integrity does retain some vitality. It reflects continuing
concerns about the appearance, public standing, and legitimacy of
the American court system.
Such concerns about judicial integrity have a legitimate role in
the evaluation of foreign convictions. Even if the limits of constitutional application and the logic of due process theory preclude a
court from deciding collateral-use questions according to the specific demands of American due process protection, they do not eliminate the need for a court to preserve its own legitimacy. A foreign
conviction resulting from foreign police conduct that is abhorrent by
American standards could, if used in a domestic court, affect the
public's sense of the fairness of the proceedings against the defendant, even if it does not undermine the reliability of the factfinding
process.
Setting workable standards for such a doctrine is a difficult
task. Where reliability and the political relations between state and
citizen are not at issue, considerations based on judicial integrity
will conflict with other interests of the American legal system, particularly the interest in punishing the guilty. Moreover, if a court
decides to exclude 'reliable evidence that is important to the prosecution's case, thereby increasing the likelihood of an acquittal, it
runs the risk of undermining public confidence in its ability to do
justice. These concerns suggest that judicial integrity should operate to exclude a conviction only when the policies underlying it
outweigh the government's interest in using an otherwise valuable
and proper piece of evidence.5 3 Thus, for example, a reliable foreign
1,See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-61 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92
(1914). See also Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
52 Rochin

v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976) ("While courts, of course, must ever
be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.").

19791

Collateral Use of Foreign Convictions

conviction using eviden6e obtained by a search that would violate
the fourth amendment might be more acceptable in impeaching an
accused murderer or prosecuting a defendant under a recidivist statute than in impeaching the credibility of an unimportant defense
witness in a petty theft trial. Finally, in weighing the value of the
evidence against the integrity issues it raises, concerns over judicial
integrity should not be accorded great weight since, by hypothesis,
the conviction at issue is reliable and the threat to judicial integrity
in this context involves a matter of appearance rather than the
direct political relationship between the government and defendant.,4
In implementing this approach, however, two additional questions grounded in due process concerns are relevant. First, when is
a conviction obtained through methods departing from customary
due process procedures reliable? Second, what procedures may a
court properly use in evaluating a challenge to the reliability of a
conviction?

H-.ELEMENTS

OF RELIABILrrY

Application of the segmented approach for evaluating the due
process concerns arising out of the collateral use of foreign convictions requires an examination of the reliability of such convictions.
The segmented approach should permit, in many instances, the
collateral use of a foreign conviction although the procedures used
in obtaining the conviction are not those used in the American trial
model."5 American courts confronted with the attempted collateral
5'This balancing approach is easily reconciled with, and indeed seems implicitly to
underlie, the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine. Under the doctrine, "a court's power to bring a person to
trial upon criminal charges is not impaired by the forcible abduction of the defendant into
the jurisdiction." United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975). The government's interest in prosecuting a person who was abducted into its jurisdiction is substantial, especially in contrast to the state's interest in admitting a prior foreign
conviction into evidence for purposes of impeachment or a recidivist statute. In the latter
cases, at most the evidence might be excluded or a charge in a multi-count indictment
dropped; in the former, the only alternative open to the state is release of the accused. Thus,
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine provides that, as a general rule, a court need not concern itself with
the manner by which the defendant entered the jurisdiction. But in a particularly egregious
case, where the interests in judicial integrity might be injured, a court will dismiss the
indictment. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). But see United
States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.) (limiting Toscanino), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985
(1975); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
11 American courts have, in a variety of contexts, accepted foreign process departing
significantly from domestic standards. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178
(4th Cir.) (German conviction admitted to impeach testimony since it was "not shown that
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use of a foreign conviction should evaluate the foreign procedures
in light of American notions of truthfulness and fairness of result
rather than blindly require that foreign criminal procedure be identical to that provided in American trials."
This result-oriented approach to the collateral use of foreign
convictions, however, should not countenance a total abandonment
of all familiar procedures. Thus, although a foreign court may dispense with, or find substitutes for, some of the technicalities of the
American criminal justice system without jeopardizing the reliability of its results, the absence of certain fundamentals would be
almost certain to do so. For instance, a foreign conviction would
certainly be lacking the requisite reliability when it was obtained
without the defendant's having had his "day in court," including a
timely statement of the charges against him, a trial or formal inquiry into those charges, an opportunity to present his defense, and
57
an impartial determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the foreign court need not provide for these fundamentals
in the adversarial form familiar in domestic courts, foreign procedures should be examined for equivalent guarantees of reliable results.
A.

Substantive Problems

The collateral use of foreign convictions is complicated by the
divergence between what the United States and foreign jurisdictions
deem criminal conduct. The range of possible differences is considerable, stretching from those foreign offenses in which the substantive elements vary only slightly from their American counterparts
to those not recognized by, or even hostile to, domestic penal statutes. Before attempting to evaluate foreign procedures, therefore,
the court must develop some means of handling the problems
caused by these substantive departures.
In some instances, the substantive departures may not provide
sufficient basis for barring the collateral use of a foreign conviction,
as, for example, where a foreign conviction is used to impeach a
the German legal system lacks the procedural protections necessary for fundamental fairness"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th
Cir. 1975) (Iranian conviction for willful homicide held sufficient to bar claim for Social
Security benefits as Iranian procedure not found to be" 'so shocking to the forum community
that it cannot be countenanced' ") (quoting Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287,
1289 (10th Cir. 1971)); United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
51Cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966) (decision whether to apply retroactively a particular constitutional rule of criminal procedures rests in part upon "the extent
to which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-determining
process at trial").
11See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 10-8, at 512-13.
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witness 5 An exception to the ban on evidence of bad character, 59
admissibility of the prior conviction stems from the availability of
some official document certifying that the individual was guilty of
a particular crime. The existence of the document justifies the exclusion of evidence contesting its validity, thereby ensuring that the
tribunal will not, as is likely in other cases in which bad-conduct
evidence is at issue, be diverted from its investigation of the case
actually before it.6e In the case of a foreign conviction, such certification would be available irrespective of the nature of the underlying
offense. Thus, even if it is not indicative of conduct that would be
an offense under American criminal law, the foreign conviction, in
most cases, would still provide evidence of bad character without
causing the problems normally associated with such evidence.
Of course, a foreign conviction based on unusual substantive
grounds might be excluded on relevancy grounds. A conviction for
an exotic foreign offense would probably not be helpful in proving
mental state, motive or knowledge. Further, many recidivist statutes have specific requirements as to what constitutes a prior conviction-requirements that foreign convictions cannot meet.61
Consider, for example, a conviction so alien to American law as one
under Islamic law for blasphemy. Such a conviction might be
relevant in impeaching the truthfulness of a witness if the foreign
2
offense included the element of uttering a falsehood.
Collateral use of foreign convictions that depart greatly from
American standards could also raise public-policy concerns about
the integrity of the courts, as already noted.63 Reliance on convictions for offenses that would be unconstitutional in American jurisdictions raises the same concerns over judicial integrity that would
be raised by reliance on convictions obtained under procedures that
S, See FED. R. EVID. 609.
"

See id. 608(b).

" See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 979-980 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn ed. 1970).
" Although it is a matter of statutory interpretation, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 227, 233
(1951), the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions with recidivist statutes require that
the prior conviction be based on facts that would constitute a felony under their laws. See,
e.g., People v. Dabney, 250 Cal. App. 2d 933, 948, 59 Cal. Rptr. 243, 253 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 911 (1968); People v. McIntire, 7 Mich. App. 133, 140, 151 N.W.2d 187, 191 (1967);
People ex rel Bell v. Martin, 283 A.D. 1005, 1005, 131 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1954) (mem.).
12 Cf. State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 350, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (1942) (allowing use of Oregon
conviction for purposes of an Idaho "persistent violator" statute without proof that underlying offense was an Idaho felony because "[g]ood citizenship requires obedience and observance to the laws of sister states as much as those of this state").
" See text and notes at notes 50-52 supra.
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are repugnant by American standards. For example, a court might
be asked to admit evidence of a Soviet conviction for the exercise
of what, in the United States, would be a first amendment right.
Since the use of such a conviction would raise the grave danger that
our courts might be perceived as condoning Soviet repression of
dissidents, any collateral use of such a conviction should be excluded.64 For these reasons, courts should be extremely wary of admitting foreign convictions when the proscription of the underlying
conduct is wholly alien to that ordinarily punished, or -constitutionally punishable, under American law.
There remains, however, a considerable middle ground comprised of offenses that depart only slightly from domestic statutes
and that are consonant with American sensibilities of right and
wrong. A good example is a foreign statute that punishes a person
for failing to come to the aid of a stranger in need. 5 Although ordinarily beyond the reach of domestic tort66 or criminal law, 7 such an
offense as "failure to rescue" would conform to our notions of decency, and, assuming the person had notice of the existence of the
offense under foreign law, might be relevant to a domestic proceeding. When confronted by such a conviction, an American court
should, of course, consider the relevancy of the conviction in light
of the diverging standards of conduct. Yet foreign convictions for
such "slightly different" offenses would not likely raise the same
concerns regarding judicial integrity as would convictions secured
under laws wholly alien to American jurisprudence.
B.

Formal Inquiry

At a minimum, a foreign conviction can be considered reliable
only if it is reached after a formal inquiry has been convened and
pursued. In part, this requirement is necessary because an informal
hearing may not provide an adequate basis for assessing the reliability of the foreign conviction. More importantly, a formal inquiry is
11It should be noted that the statement in the text applies only to the introduction of
the prior conviction. The underlying facts might still be admissible, if relevant, under certain
circumstances. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, the principle would preclude use of the conviction for impeachment purposes under Rules 608(b) and 609, but would
not bar introduction of the underlying facts under Rule 404(b).
65 See generally Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans:A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630 (1966).
"6See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 56, at 340-43 (4th ed. 1971).
", See Feldbrugge, supra note 65, at 652-54.
11One could argue that if the foreign law imposes a standard of conduct with which the
American abroad would be unfamiliar, use of such a conviction might raise notice and vagueness problems. There is no reason to think, however, that ignorance of the law should constitute grounds for exclusion of the foreign conviction in a collateral proceeding when such a
reason is generally not a recognized excuse in an ordinary American proceeding.
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the best guarantee that the conviction resulted from a careful and
principled examination of the facts. Without such an inquiry, the
accused might not have had an opportunity to present a defense and
receive impartial consideration, elements essential to reliable results. 9
C.

Right to Present a Defense
In domestic courts, the sixth amendment" ensures a defendant
the right to confront the witnesses of the prosecution," the right to
compulsory process of witnesses in his favor, 2 the right.to be present
and assist in the preparation of a defense,' 3 and the right to counsel. 4 Yet, because they derive from the adversarial model of the
American trial, some of these rights may not be relevant in a foreign
proceeding. The opportunity for cross-examination, for example,
lies at the heart of the right to confront witnesses, but is less essential in civil-law countries where the trial judge is the chief forensic
figure. 5 Likewise, the right to counsel may be far less important in
a country where procedure is relatively simple or where the protection of the defendant's procedural rights is the responsibility of the
court."
The specific guarantees provided by the American Constitution, whether relevant to a nonadversarial legal system or not, ultimately grant the defendant the right to present a defense: to respond effectively to the evidence against him and to introduce his

is

While one might at first assume that a secret proceeding might be per se unreliable,
the truth of the generalization depends on what one means by "secret." On one hand, a
proceeding closed to the public but in which a trial record is preserved for appellate review
would seem to be reliable. Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (public may
be excluded from pretrial suppression hearing). If, however, the trial is closed from public
view, no transcript is kept, and appellate review is unavailable, admissibility on both reliability and judicial-integrity grounds is seriously in question.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
72 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
7' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 In a pure inquisitorial system, the presiding officer conducts all aspects of the trial and
no counsel is present. See J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME INTHE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND,
GERMANY, FRANCE 110 n.28 (1974); Langbein, The CriminalTrial before the Lawyers, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 282 (1978) (discussing the Old Bailey). This form of procedure lives on in
American jurisprudence in the summary court-martial. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 14-1, 14-2 (rev. ed. 1969).
The pure inquisitorial approach should be distinguished from the "mixed" system familiar in contemporary continental procedure, in which prosecution and defense have a role to
play, but the judge is the chief forensic actor. See J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 62, 64-65 (1977); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES 142-43 (1977).
"' See text and notes at notes 97-100 infra.
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own version of the facts. Underlying the rights of confrontation and
compulsory process are the beliefs that the most interested party in
the proceeding-the defendant-is most likely to develop the best
evidence in his favor and that the defendant is often privy to the
largest store of information concerning underlying events. Yet these
same elements might be served by quite different procedures in a
7
foreign forum: a pure inquisitorial system,"
for example, in which
responsibility for gathering the important information rests with the
presiding judge, and not the parties, might replace our confrontation right with the opportunity to call to the attention of the inquiring court witnesses or other evidence.78 To achieve trustworthy results, however, foreign tribunals must follow procedures providing
equivalent guarantees that the defendant may bring what he knows
before the tribunal.
One might similarly conclude that a foreign tribunal must
allow the accused to be present at his hearing and that, therefore,
foreign convictions that result from trials in absentia should be
void.78 Short of this extreme," however, the question of presence
is far more problematic. Even in American courts, the right to be
present has never been absolute.8 ' Although courts have usually
denied this right to defendants only when their conduct has tended
to disrupt the proceedings,8 2 the prevailing standard focuses on
" See note 75 supra.
71 See J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 75, at 90;
Strafprozessordnung [STPO] §§ 160, 161a (1978) (W. Ger. Code of Crim. Pro.).
7" But see Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960). The
Second Circuit allowed extradition to Italy of a defendant convicted twice in absentia there,
finding that the proceedings were not "antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency,"
id. at 79. The court found that the defendant had been represented by counsel at one of his
trials in absentia, and that his cohorts were present as his codefendants at the other. Id.
'
In Austria, trial in absentia may take place for any crime punishable by up to five
years. Strafprozessordnung [STPO] § 427 (1964) (Austrian Code of Crim. Pro.). This period
is well beyond the common-law definition of a felony (one year) employed in some states, and
the offense involved can be used in those habitual-offender statutes requiring imprisonment
terms of several years. In most continental countries, however, the procedure is restricted.
See, e.g., Riess, Die Durchfiirung der Hauptverhandlung ohne Angeklagten, 30 JURISTENZErrUNG 265 (1975) (commentary on West German practices). For a cursory review in
English of the practices of conducting trials in absentia in Spain, West Germany, Italy,
South Africa, and France, see Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant From His
Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 171 (1964).
1,See Annot., 25 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1971).
82 E.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 6ther reasons for exclusion have included
a determination that the accused's presence serves no purpose, e.g., Hayton v. Egeler, 405 F.
Supp. 1133, 1150-51 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 555 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
973 (1977); United States ex rdl Spinney v. Fay, 228 F. Supp. 500, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)), or a finding that the accused
has fled the jurisdiction, see Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam) (accused
who jumped bail during trial deemed to have forfeited his confrontation right, so continued
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whether the presence of the defendant bears "a relation, reasonably
substantial, to his opportunity to defend." A procedure that regularly denies the accused access to the proceedings or denies the
accused the right to have some representative, presumably counsel,
present throughout should be highly suspect.
The problem of language adds a further dimension to these
issues. Even if physically present at his trial, a defendant who does
not understand the language of the host country would, in the absence of an interpreter, resemble in many respects an incompetent
in an American court."4 Unable to understand the proceedings, the
accused would be unable to assist in his defense. Still, such a defendant, especially if represented by competent counsel, differs from
the incompetent in that he will ordinarily learn of the particulars
of the case at the end of each day's proceedings and can assist his
counsel in preparing for trial. This factor has led American courts,
when confronted with the problem of an accused who does not understand English, to conclude that simultaneous translation for his
benefit is not necessary so long as counsel is in a position to exercise
the accused's confrontation and evidentiary rights. 5 No more
should be demanded of a foreign tribunal.
trial culminating in conviction in his absence permissible). See also Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) ("the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in
[the defendant's] presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this . . . operates as a waiver of
his right to be present and leaves the court free to proceed").
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
8'See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676, 681 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
" See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 276 (1971); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 766 (1942). Counsel is guaranteed, but there is no constitutional right to the presence of an interpreter. The right of
confrontation inherent in due process may at times necessitate the presence of an interpreter.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Markiewicz v. State, 109 Neb. 514, 520-21, 191 N.W. 648, 650-51 (1922); Garcia v. State, 151
Tex. Crim. 593, 602, 210 S.W.2d 574, 580 (1948); State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 449-52, 121
P.2d 903, 905-06 (1942). But if the defendant has some grasp of English and comprehends
the substance of the trial, no interpretation is necessary. See, e.g., United States v. De Leon,
498 F.2d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir. 1974); Flores v. State, 509 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Karumai, 101 Utah
592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942). The government is not bound to provide simultaneous translation.
See, e.g., United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 901-03 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum), aff'd, 394 U.S.
244 (1969); Tapia-Corona v. United States, 369 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United
States v. Boria, 371 F. Supp. 1068, 1069-70 (D.P.R. 1973). It may be sufficient that counsel
for the accused understands the language of the witness against whom confrontation rights
are demanded. See, e.g., Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159, 167-71, 245 P. 356, 359-60 (1926)
(holding that bilingual counsel suffices if defendant is not "hampered . . .in any manner
. . .in presenting his case"); The King v. Ah Har, 7 Hawaii 319, 322 (1888). But see State
v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 539 P.2d 900 (1975) (en banc) (additional burden of translating to client
hampers presentation of case).
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These considerations suggest that the resolution of the presence
issues is ultimately tied to the availability of local counsel. Even so,
the absence of counsel at trial should not always be conclusive in
determining the reliability of the conviction. For example, where a
foreign jurisdiction allows the defendant to participate in his trial,
the accused understands the local language, and the courtroom procedures are clear and easily learned, 8 the absence of counsel may
not impair the reliability of a resulting conviction.
Also relevant to whether the absence of counsel should preclude
the collateral use of the foreign conviction is the type of legal system
in the foreign country. Although the Supreme Court has indicated
that in an adversarial system the presence of counsel is essential for
reliable results, 7 a similar conclusion would not hold for a pure
inquisitorial system, in which no counsel, either defense or prosecution, is ever present, and the judge assumes the functions of judge,
prosecutor, and defender.88
As a practical matter, however, it is likely that either language
difficulties or the technicalities of local procedure will be significant
enough to render proceedings absent counsel unreliable. The pure
inquisitorial system, moreover, is less common than the mixed system now followed in most continental countries. 9 In such a system,
the judge ultimately controls the factual inquiry, 0 but the prosecutor and defense counsel play an important role in interpreting the
information gleaned by the judge.9 ' Since the judge cannot undertake this task for the defendant without forfeiting his claim to impartiality, 92 the presence of defense counsel in the more common,
mixed system is essential if the abcused is to receive the advantages
already enjoyed by the state. These considerations suggest that in
assessing the collateral use of foreign convictions in proceedings that
See text and notes at notes 99-100 infra.
7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See authorities cited note 75 supra.
" See generally Damaska, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 555-60 (1973).
86

,o Id. at 558-59.
" The prosecutor and defense counsel may also provide a safeguard in the form of a check
on the judge. The right to examination conducted by counsel is available under the law in
some countries, although not used in practice. The German Code of Criminal Procedure
provides, for example, that if prosecution and defense so agree, they may examine witnesses
in place of the judge. STPO § 239(I) (1978) (W. Ger. Code of Crim. Pro.). This provision is
rarely invoked, however, and is viewed by some commentators as an intrusion of AngloAmerican law, see, e.g., 2 E. SCHMiDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFFPROZESSORDNuNG 643-44
(1957).
92 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932) (judge cannot be advocate).
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may result in incarceration,93 the absence of defense counsel in the
underlying proceedings, although not conclusive of unreliability,
should weigh heavily against treating the result as trustworthy.
D.

Impartial Tribunal

The guarantees of reliability offered by the right to formal hearing and to present a defense will ultimately prove hollow if the
deliberations of the foreign court are not impartial. To be sure, proof
of impartiality in any particular trial leading to a foreign conviction
is likely to be elusive, particularly since the domestic court is in no
position to inquire into the state of mind of the foreign trier. Yet
some external indications of impartiality will ordinarily be available
to a domestic court confronted with this problem. Of primary importance will be the seriousness and regularity of judicial procedures
in the country responsible for the conviction. Evidence that the
country surrounds its courts with some dignity and proceeds in a
deliberate manner is the best initial test of whether the proceedings
are truly dedicated to the factfinding process.
Domestic courts should also be sensitive to evidence of general
prejudice in the host country. The accused American abroad may
well be the target of local hostility on ethnic, religious, racial, or
even political grounds. American courts have had some experience
with this kind of problem in domestic cases in which race is a factor
and may thus be able to recognize such hostility when it arises in
foreign courts. It should be noted, however, that in domestic courts
scrutiny of juror prejudice is greatly restricted by the general notion
that juror prejudice will not vitiate a conviction if the jurors swear
to judge the defendant on the basis of facts presented,94 the presumption being that the jurors put prejudice aside in reaching their
verdict." Although unfamiliarity among American courts with foreign legal process distinguishes the foreign case from the domestic
one, a similar presumption may be applied in considering the admissibility of a prior foreign conviction. The presumption applied
in the foreign-conviction context should be weakened slightly so as
to encourage the court to review the foreign process carefully before
rendering a decision on its trustworthiness. Of course, any judicial
bias in the form of a financial interest in the outcome of the trial
," If imprisonment is not threatened, the potential damage to the defendant through
collateral use of the foreign conviction is less, although the reliability of the conviction is
still suspect. Consequently, the hesitancy to exclude should not be as great. Cf. Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (counsel not constitutionally required if defendant not imprisoned).
11See cases collected in Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1963).
Is E.g., State v. Wright, 12 Wash. App. 585, 591-92, 530 P.2d 704, 709 (1975).
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should also lead to the exclusion of resulting convictions as unreliable. 6
It has at times been suggested that the role the judge plays in
the pure inquisitorial system 97-exercising the threshold decision to
prosecute and bring the defendant before the court-undermines
impartiality of the foreign proceeding. 8 The Supreme Court, however, in Middendorf v. Henry, 91 rejected a similar argument in a
military context. The Court held that in a summary court-martial
the court has a duty to inquire "thoroughly and impartially...
into both sides of the matter and [to] assure that the interests of
both the Government and the accused are safeguarded."'' ° This
obligation was considered sufficient to protect the accused from bias
even when counsel is denied.' 0 ' A similar analysis should apply when
evaluating other inquisitorial systems, provided that the judge is
under a similar obligation and regularly demonstrates his evenhandedness in cases under his control. Indeed, the case for reliability may even be stronger in the case of foreign convictions, given the
legal education and training advantages that foreign judges will
0 2
often have over the military officers in a court-martial.

III. TESTING FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
A.

Practical and Political Difficulties

As the foregoing discussion indicates, establishing that foreign
procedures provide sufficient guarantees of reliability is primarily a
theoretical exercise based on informed examination of the dynamics
of the foreign criminal process and the role of specific procedures
within it. To a very great extent, therefore, a proper evaluation of a
foreign conviction can take place at home in the domestic court with
the help of expert witnesses and intelligent investigation of scholarly
materials. 3 Occasionally, however, the evidence available to an
" See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); cases collected in Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 375
(1976).
"7See note 75 supra.
" See Schmidt, Introduction to THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at 2 (H.
Niebler & M. Pfeiffer trans. 1965); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 30 (2d ed. 1958).
" 425 U.S. 25 (1976). See note 81 supra.
10 425 U.S. at 41 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 75, at 14-1).
101Counsel is denied in summary court-martial proceedings. Middendorf v. Henry, 425

U.S. at 31-33; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 75, at 14-1, 14-2.
0I With respect to the German system of judicial appointments, see, for example, R.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 118-20 (3d ed. 1970).
103The literature in comparative law on protection of the accused's rights under foreign
criminal justice systems is extensive. See, e.g., THE ACCUSED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J. Coutts
ed. 1966); G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE-GRiFFITHs, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1969);
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American court will be insufficient to determine the reliability of a
conviction obtained through the foreign procedures. The attempted
collateral use may thus engender validation issues that require additional time, expense, and inconvenience for their resolution.
Such logistical problems may be even greater when the reliability of a particular trial, in contrast to the foreign procedure generally, is at issue."0 4 When confronted with damaging prior convictions, American defendants can be expected to argue almost routinely that foreign authorities acted improperly in obtaining the
convictions by flaunting the procedures of the perhaps otherwise
trustworthy foreign criminal law. Ordinarily, such contentions cannot be verified or refuted without evidence available only in the
original host country. To inhibit defendants from making such
objections, American courts may become reluctant to acknowledge
such claims, short of overwhelming (or undeniable) evidence of their
veracity.
Perfunctory rejection of challenges to the particular criminal
proceeding would tend to trivialize the due process analysis suggested earlier, however, by increasing the risk that an unreliable
conviction may be admitted into evidence. Placing too great a burden on a defendant to prove that the particular prior conviction is
untrustworthy seemingly robs him of the very protections granted
by Burgett and the Constitution.
In addition to the practical problems encountered in reviewing
reliability, political difficulties are likely to arise. Although a foreign
country can be expected to be largely indifferent to the use made
in America of any particular conviction obtained in its courts, repeated insults to its criminal justice system, the conduct of its
judges, or the wholesale rejection of its procedures, may well create
considerable resentment among foreign officials." 5 Furthermore,
37 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr P9NAL 5-318 (1966) (series of articles dealing with rights
of the accused in various countries).
For the particular techniques used to prove foreign law, see, for example, 0. SOMMEREIGH
& B. BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW: A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF (1959); McKenzie & Sarabia, The
Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 TUL. L. REV. 353 (1956); Nussbaum, The Problem of
Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941).
0I For example, apart from considerations of distance and expense, the stenographic trial
transcript that an American appeals court would regard as essential for review, see Holmes
v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972), is not
ordinarily available in German criminal proceedings, J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CmMINAL
PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 75, at 64.
'0See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) ("To permit the validity
of the .. .[seizures of property by] one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps
condemned by the court of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations
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proof of reliability in any particular case may require inquiry in the
foreign jurisdiction regarding the operation of its courts, raising the
specter of American officials interrogating foreign citizens, reinvestigating particular events, and tracking down physical evidence.' 6
A foreign court would not likely treat such interference with equanimity.0 7
These political concerns may well rise to the level of constitutional problems. Since repeated inquiry by state and federal courts
into the criminal procedures of a foreign country may affect relations between the United States and that country, a strong presumption in favor of the reliability of a foreign conviction might be
appropriate under the act-of-state doctrine, arguably barring review
of foreign convictions.' This conclusion gains some support from
Zschernig v. Miller,019 in which the Supreme Court struck down an
Oregon statute that prohibited alien heirs not living in the United
States from receiving inheritances from Oregon. decedents unless
they could prove, inter alia, that their own country would not confiscate the property. The Court observed that the statute "affect[ed]
international relations in a persistent and subtle way," because it
made "unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a
between governments and vex the peace of nations.' "). But see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 460-61 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
"I Judicial humility also counsels against an American court considering itself an appeals court for foreign legal process. See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 15960 (1825).
10 The foreign governments may also try to thwart inquiry by American courts. Such has
been the case in the antitrust area, where foreign governments have enacted antidiscovery
laws aimed at rendering ineffective the application of the United States antitrust laws. See,
e.g., Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent
Developments in the Law Concerning the ForeignIllegality Excuse for Non-Production,14
VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 748 (1974).
I" The doctrine requires courts to "refrain from examining the validity of an act of a
foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public
interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
(1965). As a rule of law, the doctrine would not prohibit collateral examination of foreign
convictions since the "reliability" of the judgment, rather than its "validity," is being examined: a court's disapproval would have no effect on the policies of the foreign country. Furthermore, the doctrine principally relates to choice of law and "is applied only in cases in
which . . . the settlement of a claim or interest involv[es] the same transaction as that
involved in . . . the [foreign] exercise of jurisdiction," id. § 41, Comment j.
As a statement of policy or principle, however, the doctrine does have some significance.
"The policy underlying the doctrine is that the courts should abstain from any action that
might hinder the executive branch in the conduct of foreign relations." Id. § 41, Comment c.
The necessity of courts to pry into and pass judgment on foreign adjudications may lead to
political repercussions that would hinder development of foreign relations.
M 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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more authoritarian basis than our own.""10 The Court consequently
held that the statute intruded upon the powers allocated by the
Constitution to the federal government."'
The extension of Zschernig to the prior-conviction arena, however, is unwarranted. First, if examination of a foreign conviction
were entirely precluded, the accused's due process rights would be
denied. In contrast, no due process problems were involved in
Zschernig. But even if such problems had been present, the preclusion of review of foreign law in Zschernig allowed foreign heirs to
receive their rightful inheritances and thus would have alleviated
any such problems. Second, review of foreign convictions has less
potential for creating international tensions than does the denial of
inheritances to foreign citizens. The former only involves an insult
to the foreign judicial system, whereas the latter effects a "real or
imagined wrong" to the citizens of the foreign country.112 Indeed,
Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence that many procedures
under state and federal law engender incidental interference in foreign relations similar to the inheritance statute, but without transgressing the boundaries of permissible state activity."'
As an alternative to conclusive acceptance of foreign convictions, American courts might choose, as Zschernig suggests by analogy, to exclude all foreign convictions as a matter of course or to bar
admission whenever the defendant objects to their reliability.",
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
112 The Zschernig Court noted that" '[e]xperience has shown that international contro"
I

versies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.'" Id. (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
"1 389 U.S. at 461-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"4 In addition to the act-of-state doctrine, see note 108 supra, a second doctrine, expressed in the familiar nostrum that "[t]he courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another," The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.), provides support
for consistent exclusion of foreign convictions. American courts have traditionally refused
to enforce judgments against persons for crimes committed and adjudicated abroad. See
generally Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1932); Stoel, The Enforcement of ForeignNon-CriminalPenal and Revenue Judgments in England and the United States, 16 INr'L CoMP. L.Q. 663 (1967). This doctrine
originated in notions of conflicting sovereignty, see State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 1127-28, 193 S.W.2d 919, 926 (1946); Folliott v. Ogden, 1 Black., H.
123, 135, 126 Eng. Rep. 75, 82 (C.P. 1789), affl'd, 3 T.R. 726, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (K.B. 1790),
4 Bro. P.C. 111, 2 Eng. Rep. 75 (H.L. 1792); F. STAU ACH, Dm ANWENDUNG AUSLANDISCHEN
STRAFRECHTS DURCH DEN INLANDISCHEN RicHTRr
160-63 (1964), and the common law's bias
toward territorial jurisdiction, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 38, Comment b (1965). Today it derives its force from the notion that an
attempt by one jurisdiction to enforce the laws of another will usually lead to a tumultuous,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:82

This option would eliminate both the due process and the foreignrelations problems. Thus, in recent years some jurisdictions have
excluded the use of foreign convictions under habitual-offender statutes.' 5 Such a result is unsatisfactory, however, since it will regularly subordinate the interests that the criminal justice system has
in acquiring probative evidence to the often diaphanous concerns
over foreign relations in cases in which, by hypothesis, no due process problems exist. By elevating form over substance, this solution
threatens to allow a guilty defendant to mitigate his punishment or
to escape conviction altogether upon exclusion of reliable evidence.
Ultimately, some middle course is necessary between the extremes of a strong presumption in favor of the reliability of a foreign
conviction, with all of the due process problems it creates, and that
of total exclusion of foreign convictions, with the unnecessary harm
often fruitless investigation into the operations of a judicial system alien to the court hearing
the case. Cf. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring)
(enforcing revenue laws of another state requires passing "upon the provisions for the public
order of" that state), affl'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
"I One commentator, writing in 1964, found sixteen states with habitual-offender statutes explicitly providing for the use of prior foreign convictions. Pye, The Effect of Foreign
CriminalJudgments Within the United States, 32 U. Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 114, 128 n.73
(1964), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRmiNAL LAW 479 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965). He
omitted mention of two statutes then in force, 1953 Ark. Acts No. 228, § 2 (current version
at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2329 (1977)); 1937 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 98 (current version at S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-7-7 to -8 (1979). Since that time, there has been a marked trend
away from giving recidivist effect to foreign convictions. Significantly fewer states now explicitly consider foreign convictions for this purpose. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2329 (1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 668 (West Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 529.1 (West Supp. 1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-4 (West 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 54 (West 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-19-21 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.2801 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974).
Several states have amended the clear language of former statutes, inserting a more ambiguous phrase, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.080 (Supp. 1978) ("any other jurisdiction"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon 1979) ("previously convicted of two felonies"); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-18-501 (1979) ("any other jurisdiction"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1979) ("any
prior felony"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1975) ("any other jurisdiction"), while
others have changed their law specifically to exclude such convictions, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 16-13-101 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.155 (West 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1976).
Many states directly preclude the use of foreign convictions for recidivist purposes. E.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West Supp. 1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279,
§ 25 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-147 (Supp. 1979) (drug offenders
only); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.725 (1977); S.C. CODE § 17-25-40 (1976);
VA. CODE § 19.2-297 (Supp. 1979) (petit larceny only); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977).
Many common-law jurisdictions exclude the use of foreign convictions in their recidivist
statutes. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 80(2) (England &
Wales); Crimes Act, 1914-1973, § 17(1) AcTs AusTL. P. (1974).
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it might do to the criminal justice system generally. This middle
ground can be found only in a more detailed and balanced structure
of presumptions and the burden of proof governing collateral use of
prior foreign convictions.
B.

A Proposal for Examining Foreign Convictions

A careful structuring of the burdens in cases involving the collateral use of foreign convictions can accommodate the various interests implicated. Initially, the state should notify the defendant
of its intention to use the foreign conviction. Since a foreign conviction may involve remote sources of information the investigation of
which might lead to protracted deliberations, an in camera hearing
on the admissibility of the conviction should take place well in
advance of trial. At that hearing, the proponent of the priorconviction evidence should have the burden of production and persuasion in proving the existence of a foreign conviction."' The first
substantive discussions should address the general reliability of the
procedures of the foreign country. Here the party opposing introduction should have the burden of production in challenging the foreign
legal system and the proponent should have the burden of persuasion in establishing its general reliability, probably with experts or
treatises." 7 A finding that the foreign legal system lacks sufficient
guarantees of reliable verdicts should end the matter, precluding
introduction of the conviction.
If, on the other hand, the foreign system meets the test of general procedural guarantees of reliability, investigation of the specifics of the particular conviction at issue becomes appropriate. At this
point, the opponent has the burden of production in specifying the
defects in the criminal procedures leading to his conviction
abroad."' These allegations, which may focus either on the ways in
which the foreign conviction was insufficient under the foreign juris"I The Court in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), did not assign the ultimate burden
of proof for cases involving the use of allegedly insufficient prior convictions. At least one
court has noted the continuing silence of the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence on the burden of proof in disputes over the collateral use
of prior in-state convictions. Reinsch v. Quines, 274 Ore. 97, 104 n.5, 546 P.2d 135, 139 n.5
(1976).
",

See note 103 supra.

This burden should be set rather high, demanding either a detailed sworn statement
or extrinsic evidence so that those issues for which the prosecution must gather evidence will
be limited. This requirement is not unreasonable, since the accused is in control of the facts
surrounding his prior conviction. The temptation to act as a de facto foreign appeals court
should, however, be resisted. See note 106 supra.
'
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diction's own standards or those aspects of the foreign procedure
that can be said to shock the conscience,119 will narrow considerably
the range of issues to be investigated. Once these allegations are
properly before the court, the proponent will have the burden of
rebutting them by proving that the foreign jurisdiction provided the
safeguards necessary for reliable results by following its normal procedure. At this point, and usually only at this point, an intrusion
into foreign territory may become necessary for deciding the issue.
This structured procedure should vindicate both the defendant's right to exclude an unreliable conviction and the state's interest in introducing probative evidence, while minimizing the friction created by overseas investigations. In practical terms, it may
permit in many cases an early resolution of the reliability issue.
And, where the conviction is suspect, the state will ordinarily have
to commit time and resources to support the conviction only after
the defendant has made the information held by him or his witness
available to all parties. The requirements built into the process at
each juncture ensure that the number of foreign investigations will
be restricted to only the most important cases.
CONCLUSION

The collateral use of foreign convictions may often advance the
same interests of the criminal justice system as the collateral use of
domestic convictions. Yet the use of foreign convictions in American
criminal proceedings gives rise to a host of peculiar problems, which
have to date escaped careful analysis by the courts.
The constitutional standards established by Burgett v. Texas
are the starting point for the analysis of these problems. Once it is
acknowledged that, as this comment argues, the holding of Burgett
turns on the Court's concern over the use of reliable convictions, the
analysis of constitutional problems raised by the collateral use of
foreign convictions becomes a simple one. A court must then establish criteria for evaluating the ability of foreign criminal process to
provide reliable judgments. And, by properly dividing the burdens
of production and persuasion between the proponent and opponent,
most disputes concerning the collateral use of foreign convictions
will be promptly and efficiently resolved. The courts, by adopting
a flexible approach to the collateral use of foreign convictions, modifying the procedures as situations demand, will be able both to
ensure that the accused's constitutional rights are not impaired and
"I See text and notes at notes 50-54 supra.
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to permit, in a variety of instances, the introduction of probative
evidence.
David K. Linnan

